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Abstract 
The success of supply-side risk-sharing contracts in achieving behavioural change amongst 
health care providers is dependant upon the trade-off between reduced costs from reduction in 
‘predictable risks’ (e.g. supplier-induced demand) and increased costs from the sharing of 
‘random risk’, optimally managed under a single large pool into several smaller risk-bearing 
pools.  Typical capitation contracts do not distinguish between the degree of random and 
predictable risk shared with service providers.  The strength of the financial incentives in 
capitation contracts must be finely balanced, to ensure that elements associated with ‘luck’ do 
not lead to perverse outcomes that crowd out the achievement of the desired benefits.   
 
By examining the effects of financial risk-sharing on incentives for practitioner-owner 
behaviour and practice ownership, this paper explores some of the likely consequences of 
contracts sharing over-large amounts of random risk with primary health care practitioners.  
Likely perverse outcomes include fewer and higher-cost consultations than under fee-for-
service, a systemic allocation of care quality penalising sicker-than-average populations that 
occurs in addition to the well-established effects of deliberate cream-skimming, a bifurcation 
of the supply and allocation of services into a two-tier system of small privately-owned 
providers serving healthier-than-average populations and large nonprofit providers serving 
sicker-than-average populations, and long-term distortions in the allocation of practitioners 
amongst practice ownership forms and systems of different design.  The likelihood of these 
outcomes occurring and the costs they invoke must be carefully considered by policy-makers 
when designing remuneration in primary health care contracts.   
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Introduction 
“There are many mechanisms for paying physicians; some are good and some are bad. 
The three worst are fee-for-service, capitation and salary”.             (Robinson, 2001:149)  
 
Recent years have seen the emergence of many health care policies employing risk-sharing 
tools aimed at aligning the activities of service providers with the objectives of purchasers 
and funders.  An example is managed care, where responsibility for managing all aspects of 
the financing and delivery of health care for a defined set of patients is assigned to specific 
care management entities (Robinson, 2004; Rivers and Tsai, 2003).   Whilst managed care 
models involve the use of many non-price elements (e.g. utilisation review), a common 
characteristic is some element of financial risk-sharing (‘supply-side cost-sharing’ – Ellis and 
McGuire, 1986).  
 
The agency theory rationale for supply-side cost-sharing is that by contractually linking the 
care manager’s financial returns to a proxy for the achievement of some desired 
characteristics, or decoupling of financial returns from undesirable characteristics, the desired 
activities will be pursued and the undesirable ones eschewed.  Effort exerted by the 
practitioner, which is unobserved and unobservable by the policy-maker or insurance 
purchaser setting the contract terms, will be redirected towards the pursuit of desirable, rather 
than undesirable, activities (Robinson, 2001).  Commonly-used supply side cost-sharing 
contracts are price-and-volume, partial and full capitation (Danzon, 1997).   
 
Partial or full capitation contracts have become common in primary health care remuneration.  
They comprise the principal form of government-funded remuneration for England’s Primary 
Care Trusts (Keen, Light and Mays, 1999), are very common ways for insurers to remunerate 
primary care physicians in the United States (Robinson, 2004; Hagen, 1999) and form the 
basis of New Zealand’s partially tax-funded primary health care strategy implemented in 
2002 (King, 2001).  Decoupling remuneration and inputs (e.g. physician time, consultations) 
and linking remuneration with outcome proxies (e.g. patients, who if healthier generate fewer 
costs for the care provider as they consume fewer consultations) has led to their extensive use 
in public sector ‘outcomes-based’ (Honore, et. al, 2004) and ‘performance-based’ (Martin, 
2002) contracting generally, as a method for health care purchasing.  Reduced emphasis on 
the consultation as the payment determinant is attributed with a shift in primary care delivery 
focus away from interventions in the event of illness towards the promotion and maintenance 
of wellness (Coster and Gribben, 1999; Cumming, 1999; Malcolm, 1997).  Crampton, Sutton 
and Foley (2001) summarise the justification for New Zealand’s primary care policy adoption 
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of capitation to be increased equity, targeting of high health need, encouraging a team 
approach to primary health care, and a change in focus towards a care management model as 
opposed to a model of episodic intervention with a focus on illness.   
 
Many commentaries and analyses of health care capitation contracts take a broad view over 
many dimensions of how incentive contracts affect provider behaviour (e.g. Robinson, 2001; 
Dranove, Simon and White, 1998) and the relationship between insurer-purchasers and 
service providers (e.g. Cooper and Rebitzer, 2006).  Others have focused principally on the 
effects for government and patients (e.g. Crampton, Sutton and Foley, 2002; Cumming, 1999; 
Coster and Gribben, 1999; Malcolm, 1997).  Few focus upon how the contracts affect the 
incentives for ownership of primary health care firms and thereby influence sector structure.   
Dranove, Simon and White (2002) provide one exception, albeit addressing primary care 
amongst their analysis of the effects on specialists and hospitals.  This gap in the literature is 
surprising, given the extent to which in the primary care sector the individuals whose 
behaviour is to be changed are generally the owners of the businesses as well as service 
providers (Scott, 2000; Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000). 
 
This paper addresses the gap in the literature by focusing specifically on the role of financial 
risk in primary health care contracts, its effects upon sector ownership and investment, and 
how these effects flow through into the supply of primary care services, the distribution of 
available services amongst patients and overall sector structure.  At its core is the fact that all 
contracts allocate financial risk between the purchaser and the service provider. The 
effectiveness of any risk-sharing agreement relies upon how well the rewarded proxy matches 
the desired objective.  If the match is close, then the desired outcome is highly likely to occur.  
However, if the match is poor, or fails to anticipate possible provider responses, the contract 
opens up the potential for perverse outcomes to arise, the costs of which may exceed the gains 
anticipated from pursuit of the desired behaviour (Dranove, Simon and White, 1998; 
Robinson, 2001).      
 
Specifically, the paper examines the ways in which various contract forms manage the 
financial consequences of ‘uncontrollable’ and ‘unpredictable’ factors in addition to the 
‘controllable’ factors of provider behaviour that the risk-sharing contract seeks to address.  A 
feature of health care contracting is that third-party purchasing occurs because governments 
and insurers are more efficient managers of the financial risks of patients’ unknown demand 
for health care than the patients themselves.  When third-party purchasers enter into capitation 
contracts with service providers, they share random patient demand risk along with the costs 
of predictable risk that are controllable by the providers.  These risks are not shared under fee-
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for-service or price-and-volume contracts.  As the capitation contract bundles both risks 
together and shares them in equal proportions, the ability for capitation contracts to 
successfully alter provider behaviour without inducing over-costly effects arising from 
reduced efficiency in managing random risk lies in setting the incentive strength 
appropriately.  If the incentive is too strong (i.e. shares ‘too much’ random risk), then there 
will inevitably be consequences that flow through into sector costs, ownership patterns and 
structure.   A number of likely perverse outcomes in the event of over-much random risk 
being shared are identified.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section one discusses the contracting process, and the ways 
in which contracts that allocate risk affect sector efficiency, the firm survival prospects and 
the willingness of individuals to invest their physical and human capital.  Section two applies 
the theory from section one to primary health care markets.  This section discusses patient 
demand uncertainty, third party purchasing in health care, and how risks of different types 
affect the behaviour of primary health care providers differently.  Section three then discusses 
some of the likely consequences arising when over-much random risk is shared with primary 
care providers.  These include fewer and higher-cost consultations than under fee-for-service, 
a systemic allocation of care quality penalising sicker-than-average populations that occurs in 
addition to the well-established effects of deliberate cream-skimming, a bifurcation of the 
supply and allocation of services into a two-tier system of small privately-owned providers 
serving healthier-than-average populations and large nonprofit providers serving sicker-than-
average populations, and long-term distortions in the allocation of practitioners amongst 
practice ownership forms and systems of different design.  Section four concludes with a 
discussion of the implications for policy-makers and insurance companies.   
 
1. Contracts and Risk 
A fundamental economic axiom is that a firm will be financially viable in the long run only if 
the income received from the provision of goods and services (or gifts, donations and 
sponsorship to fund the provision of benefits in the case of a charitable organisation) at least 
equals the costs of producing those goods and services.  Costs include a fair return to the 
owners for the use of the physical and human capital provided, or the costs of replacing 
essential capital (both physical and human) in the case of charitable and non-profit 
organisations with no defined shareholder-owners.   If income does not exceed these costs, in 
the long run the firm must either increase the prices it charges, reduce its costs or exit from 
producing goods and services (including charitable ones).  The owners of human and physical 
capital will receive better returns on their capital if it is invested elsewhere.  
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 For a price-taking firm operating in a competitive market, or operating in a market where 
price regulations or concentration of buyer power inhibit its ability to raise prices unilaterally, 
increasing the income received per unit of output is not feasible.  The firm’s survival depends 
upon achieving cost reductions.  Cost reductions may occur from innovations in the firm’s 
production processes that lead to lower unit costs per quantity of output of a given quality 
produced, a reduction in the number of goods and services produced, or a reduction in quality 
of goods produced.    
 
Self-evident though they may be, these simple concepts are fundamental to the structure of an 
industry sector – who will own the firms (i.e. supply the capital) and how they will interact 
with other parties.  Contracts affect financial outcomes for firm owners, and thus their 
willingness to invest in particular firms, the activities that the firms will engage in, and the 
types of contracts that characterise those activities.  Different contracts will therefore lead to 
different ownership incentives and firm behaviour, in a complex nexus of sector 
interrelationships, just as a change in owner will affect the nature of the contracts a firm will 
enter into.   Irrespective of whether a firm is maximising financial profit or pursuing some 
other objective, the bottom line is that the primary objective of the owners and managers of 
any firm is to first ensure that it survives, if it is unviable to wind it up as rapidly as possible 
to avoid incurring further unrecoverable losses, and to ensure that, if the firm is viable, then 
the activities it undertakes do not increase the risks to the firm’s survivability beyond its 
capacity to bear them.  Parties with market power must be aware of the consequences that 
their contracts will have on firm survivability, investment patterns and industry structure.  The 
consequences of injudicious contracts may ultimately impact upon the ability for the party 
with market power to achieve its desired objectives.   
1.1 The Contracting Process 
When a firm is taking all possible steps to utilise internal productive efficiency enhancements, 
its survivability is determined by the contracts it enters into with customers and suppliers.  In 
negotiating the contract terms, managers will endeavour to ensure that the firm’s long-term 
survival prospects are enhanced (e.g. by only entering into sale contracts where remuneration 
at least meets costs).   A typical contract process will involve search for potential partners, 
negotiation of terms, drawing up of the contract, monitoring contract performance and 
enforcing the terms of the contract in the event of breach (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  
Parties will voluntarily enter into a contract only where its terms result in both parties being 
better off than if the contract did not exist (Coase, 1937).   
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In order to ensure that the contract terms are advantageous to both parties, the parties must 
both assess the specification of the goods and the price of exchange, and anticipate additional 
costs and risks arising as a consequence of entering into the agreement.  Parties must agree on 
terms that minimise transaction costs, use incentive terms and monitoring to limit 
opportunism, allocate risk, facilitate investment in specific assets and allocate property rights 
in such a manner that both parties are better off with the contract than without it (Boyd, Evans 
and Quigley, 2000, building on Williamson, 1986).    
1.2 Uncertainty, Risk Allocation and Contract Efficiency 
Establishing the terms dealing with the management of transaction costs, facilitation of 
investment in specific assets and allocation of property rights is usually straightforward, as 
these relate principally to deterministic factors (although one party may have stronger 
bargaining power, which may affect allocation of gains).  However, management of 
opportunism and allocation of risk are more problematic, as they deal with uncertainties.  For 
example, will a party act opportunistically by using superior information to deprive the other 
party, and if so, how will this occur?; Will the ‘state of nature’ change, altering the 
assumptions under which the contract was entered into, and thereby changing the payoffs 
received by both parties?).  Contractual uncertainty thus creates a risk to the long-term 
viability of the firm.  Two types of risk must be considered: unpredictable and uncontrollable 
changes in the state of nature that neither party can anticipate or manage (‘random’ risk), and 
factors that may arise in the future, but are predictable and controllable by one or other of the 
parties to the contract (‘predictable’ risk) (Milgrom and Roberts, 2002).    
 
An efficient contract will allocate the costs of risks eventuating to the party best able to bear 
them.  Contract theory indicates that desired outcomes are achieved at least cost when 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992): 
1. the costs of ‘predictable’ risk are borne by the party who can best control the level of 
the risk occurring, via standard incentive terms (e.g. the costs of shirking should be 
borne by the party who can choose to either shirk or exert full effort); and 
2. ‘random’ risks are allocated in proportion to the ability of each party to bear them (e.g. 
a well-resourced party can ‘insure’ a less well-resourced party against financial failure 
in the event of random events by absorbing the costs of random risk, albeit with the 
premium for such insurance reflected in the contract compensation).    
 
In the event of either risk type being inappropriately allocated, the contract outcome is less 
advantageous than it might otherwise have been for at least one of the parties.  For example, if 
a less well-resourced firm incurs costs of a ‘random’ risk eventuating that exceed its revenues 
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from contract remuneration and reserves, then at best it must reduce costs by reducing service 
or product quality, or at worst it will fail financially and exit the market.  In either event, the 
more well-resourced party also suffers losses (e.g. under the contract, it receives lower-quality 
products than specified, or no products at all) and must incur additional costs to seek redress 
(monitoring and enforcement) and the search and contracting costs relating to seeking and 
negotiating a new contract with a new supplier.  
 
If the costs to the well-resourced party of seeking redress are higher than the costs of bearing 
the losses on the contract, then it would have been less costly to have underwritten the other 
party’s random risk via the contract, and continue to enjoy high quality products and services 
should unforeseen events occur (with the costs of bearing this risk reflected in the contract 
compensation terms).  Likewise, premiums paid for high quality (or sanctions for low quality) 
make it costly for the producing party to consciously choose to lower quality, thereby 
disadvantaging the purchasing party.  It is more efficient for the purchasing party to manage 
the risk of quality reduction by offering incentives for high quality, up to the level of the costs 
anticipated in seeking redress for low quality.   
 
2. Application to Primary Health Care 
The principal contract in the provision of primary health care is between the purchaser of care 
and the service provider.  The nature of the health care product, and the costs and risks 
associated with its exchange, have led to a sector structure characterised by large third-party 
purchasers contracting with small, mostly owner-operated practices, to deliver health care to 
patients.  
2.1 The Service Provider 
Primary care service providers may be large corporate entities, but are more commonly sole 
general practitioners or a small group of practitioners working co-operatively (often with a 
formal co-operative agreement, in the form of Hansmann’s (1996) supplier-owned co-
operative) in order to deliver services to a defined set of patients with whom they have either 
explicit contracts or implicit agreements to provide ongoing care delivery as indicated by the 
patient’s health state (the ‘patient list’, ‘book’ or ‘patient panel’).  The repeated interactions 
between a specific individual and primary care provider also distinguish this sector from other 
forms of health care delivery (e.g. surgical intervention) where repeat transactions by a single 
individual with a specific practitioner are much rarer (Scott, 2000; McGuire, 2000).  
 
7/26/2007 -8- 8
Both Robinson (2001) and Scott (2000) identify the ‘one-to-one’ nature of general practice, 
and Newhouse (1973) identifies the advantages financially of sole practice in primary care.  
Sole practice is generally preferable as minimal teamwork is required to deliver any specific 
instance of care (compared to surgery, where many different specialists work concurrently on 
the same patient) (Newhouse, 1973), there are limited capital investments (aside from human) 
required, leading to limited need to form corporate entities for the purpose of capital-raising 
(Howell, 2005), and because the practitioner is able to receive the rewards from exerting his 
own effort and returns on his own human and physical capital without having to share them 
with a partner whose effort is unobservable and therefore difficult to contractually assign 
under a partnership or equity-sharing agreement (Hart and Grossman, 1986).  Dranove and 
Satterthwaite (2000) identify the preference of both patients and practitioners for direct 
contractual relationships between patients and specific practitioners, as opposed to a firm, for 
the ongoing delivery of care.  Under these arrangements, the individual practitioner ‘owns’ 
the patient list and is personally incentivised to exert effort to build relationships with patients 
and to repeatedly deliver high-quality care in order to secure future income streams 
(crystallised as practice ‘goodwill’ on the balance sheet).  As such effort is extremely difficult 
to incentivise contractually, all other things being equal, individual ownership is economically 
superior to salary or partnership, as the practice owner directly receives the return to his own 
effort exerted via returns as owner.  The typical practice is thus small (between 1200 and 
2000 patients is common in New Zealand – Howell, 2005), with consultations being delivered 
repeatedly to the same small number of individuals.  
 
The superiority of the sole practitioner and provider co-operative arrangements appears 
confirmed by their persistence over time (similar ownership arrangements prevail in other 
markets where a high proportion of capital invested is human, such as law and accountancy).  
If any other model of ownership was economically or clinically superior, then practitioners 
would have voluntarily adopted it or investor-owners who were not themselves practitioners 
would have entered the market, hiring salaried employees in order to appropriate the gains 
from a more efficient ownership form (Hansmann, 1996).  Dranove, Simon and White (2002) 
identify that the rise of corporate primary health care provision is strongly correlated with the 
rise of capitation contracting.  This paper will demonstrate that this is likely occurring as a 
consequence of the ways in which capitation contracts allocate financial risk to small firms 
with little physical capital or debt-bearing capacity, and because superior profits are available 
in some practices.   However, the mechanism via which this occurs is not the pursuit of larger 
profits, but the amelioration of losses.   
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2.2 Provider Cost Structures 
The typical product delivered by primary care providers is a patient consultation.  It is also the 
provider’s primary cost-driver.  Irrespective of whether the motivation for the consultation is 
treatment- or prevention-related, in a typical service the patient has an exclusive meeting (e.g. 
face-to-face, telephone) with the practitioner or other staff member (e.g. nurse).  All 
consultations require inputs of time and knowledge (human capital) by the practitioner and 
other staff.   
 
Consultation costs are principally comprised of the opportunity cost of the practitioner’s and 
other staff member’s time (e.g. nurse, receptionist) (including a fair return on human capital 
for the practitioner-owner).  As physical capital requirements for a primary health care 
business are generally low, the share of overheads in average consultation costs is small, 
comprising principally of rent, power, supplies, etc.  Cost reductions per consultation are 
generally achievable only by reducing the time per consultation or the practitioner’s 
expectation of the acceptable return received on (predominantly) human capital (i.e. 
reservation wage).   
2.3 Random Risk Management and Third-Party Purchasing 
The purchaser of primary health care may be an individual, but is more commonly an 
insurance company or government agency purchasing care on behalf of a policy-holder or 
citizen.  The industry is thus characterised by two distinct sub-markets: an upstream risk 
management (insurance) market, managing individuals’ uncertainties regarding the need for 
and ability to finance care, and a downstream health care provision (service delivery) market 
where the care for ill individuals1 is purchased and delivered (Howell, 2006).  
 
The upstream risk management market arises as a consequence of the uncertainty that all 
individuals face with respect to their ability to finance care when falling ill.  For the most part, 
knowing if and when a given individual will fall ill is unpredictable (i.e ‘random’).   The ways 
in which health sector contracts handle this uncertainty (hereinafter termed ‘random demand 
risk’) are critical to sector efficiency.  United States evidence suggests that only around 20% 
to 25% of individual demand variation can be reliably predicted using characteristics such as 
age, ethnicity, income, gender and previous consumption of care (Newhouse, 1996; 
Robinson, 2004).   
 
                                                     
1 For the purposes of this paper, ‘falling ill’ means a patient requires a consultation.   The consultation may be an intervention for 
a specific illness, or the requirement that some form of preventative treatment (e.g. vaccination, education) be delivered.   
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However, for a large number of people, the probability of a predictable number falling ill in a 
given time period is ascertainable, even though the actual identity of the individuals who will 
fall ill is unpredictable.  This leads to demand for insurance.  Arrow (1963) identifies that 
individuals can enter into contracts that aggregate (pool) individual uncertainties about future 
demand for care in order to manage ‘random demand risk’ more efficiently than if the 
individual managed the risk alone (self-insurance).  The pool may be managed by a firm or a 
government.  In either case, the pool ‘insures’ the individual against unpredictable costs.  Via 
explicit or implicit2 insurance contracts, premiums paid when well or taxation funding 
agreements guarantee certainty of access to care (as specified in the insurance contract or 
government policy terms) for an individual when illness strikes (Zeckhauser, 1970; Cutler and 
Zeckhauser, 2000).  The financial vulnerability of an individual to the costs of random events 
(risk-aversion) motivates individuals with low ability to bear the random costs to share the 
risk by buying insurance policies or by supporting taxation-funded government schemes 
underwriting health care costs.   
 
The superiority of pooled management (insurance) over individual management (self-
insurance) derives from two sources.  Firstly, the law of large numbers enables better ex ante 
predictability of the likely demand and hence costs of care for a group of individuals than for 
the individual alone.  The insurer can allocate the costs of care for those individuals falling ill 
amongst all pool members, removing individual uncertainty about affordability should the 
‘bad luck’ of falling ill occur.  Secondly, the larger the size of the group, the more individuals 
amongst whom the costs of differences between the manager’s predictions and actual costs of 
care incurred can be shared, thereby reducing the cost per individual of ‘random’ variations 
arising from the limited foresight of the insurer in predicting actual costs.  The pool manager 
can also use surpluses (reserves) from ‘lucky’ periods where demand (and cost) was lower 
than anticipated to cover losses from ‘unlucky’ periods when demand (and cost) exceeds 
predictions.  The ability to levy members in future periods provides security for loans to cover 
losses in periods where reserves are insufficient.  Large insurers and governments are 
therefore in a much better position to manage the costs of random demand variations more 
cost-effectively than risk-averse individuals.   As most risk-averse individuals prefer to 
sacrifice a small, certain amount regularly to offset the financial consequences of an 
unpredictable, large, potentially financially crippling expense, they assign risk management, 
and purchasing responsibility to these third parties.    
                                                     
2 Taxation-funded government pools undertake the insurance role implicitly as a consequence of policies and political decisions.   
The terms of the implicit contract are the obligations on both parties under the policy or legislation.  Private sector insurance 
companies have explicit contracts with individuals identifying the obligations on both parties (the ‘insurance policy’).  
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2.4 Risk and Remuneration in Primary Care 
Remuneration contracts for primary health care provision have typically been one of two 
types: simple fee-for-service and price-and-volume, where primary care providers are paid a 
fixed fee per patient consultation; and more complex contracts, such as partial and full 
capitation, where providers face incentives to manage the costs of care delivery because part 
or all of their remuneration is invariant to the number of consultations provided (Dranove and 
Satterthwaite, 2000; Danzon, 1997; Newhouse, 1996).   
 
2.4.1 Risk Under Fee-for-Service 
Under fee-for-service payment arrangements, primary care providers receive a fixed fee for 
each consultation provided (with different fees for different consultation types), reflecting the 
importance of the consultation as the principal cost driver.  The consultation is an easily-
measured metric, involving relatively low transaction and monitoring costs for both the 
purchaser and the provider.  As long as the service fee at least meets the costs of providing the 
consultation, service providers will be financially viable in the long run.  The provider faces 
no financial risks from the occurrence of truly random events affecting the number of 
consultations provided, such as the emergence of an unpredictable or uncontrollable epidemic 
(e.g. ‘bird flu’) or ‘random demand risk’ allocation (i.e. the natural distribution of patients 
amongst practices that results in some practices having a patient mix of individuals with 
unknown higher-than-average demand (‘sicker’) and some with a patient mix of lower-than-
average demand (‘healthier’) individuals).   Each consultation provided is fully 
compensated3.  Random risks are borne by the purchasing entities.  If more consultations are 
provided as a consequence of random events increasing practice demand, the additional fees 
are paid by the purchaser.  It is the purchaser’s financial viability that is threatened by random 
risk variations.  
 
The number of consultations provided by a practice remunerated by fee-for-service is 
determined principally by the willingness to supply practitioner and staff time at the contract 
fee.  As the costs of each consultation are fully compensated, practices can supply as many or 
as few consultations as they chose (or register ‘on the books’ the number of patients they 
deem will result in the number of consultations the practice is willing to provide) without 
altering the ongoing financial viability of the practice.  Incremental income from an additional 
consultation is at least equal to incremental cost, meaning financial viability (profitability) is 
unaffected by the level of effort expended (number of consultations provided).   
                                                     
3 Each consultation invokes an obligation to pay.  Whilst all practices have bad debts – that is, patients who do not pay their bills 
- this is no different to any other business.  It is at the discretion of the owner whether these bad debts are written off or pursued.    
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 Whilst insulating providers from random risk, fee-for-service contracts invoke a specific 
predictable risk: supplier-induced demand.  As both patients and their funding agents face an 
information asymmetry regarding the nature of and the most cost-effective treatment methods 
for treating, an illness, providers can request more or more costly tests and pharmaceuticals 
and/or induce the patient to consume more consultations than is necessary to effect a cure 
(Arrow. 1963; Pauly, 1968; Zeckhauser, 1970; Zweifel and Manning, 2000).   
 
If the payer is an individual patient, supplier-induced demand is unlikely to be a significant  
problem, as a patient with limited reserves will quickly reach a point where the additional cost 
threatens his financial viability, and he will terminate the contract.  However, if the payer is 
an insurer or government entity, the individual patient does not directly bear the costs of 
supplier-induced demand.  The insuring entity pays the service provider.  The patient faces 
little financial incentive to constrain the doctor’s high cost-causing behaviour.  Third-party 
purchasing also encourages the patient to engage in another well-known behaviour that 
increases predictable risk for purchasers – over-consumption of services (e.g. seeking 
subsidised treatment for very minor complaints that might be more cost-effectively treated by 
other means such as an over-the-counter pharmaceutical, or simply for reassurance – known 
as over-consumption by the ‘worried well’) (Pauly, 2000; Newhouse, 1996).  In either case, 
third-party payers initially bear the additional costs of both of these forms of predictable risk, 
although all patients will ultimately collectively bear the costs via higher premiums or taxes. 
 
The efficient contractual management of predictable risk involves making the party 
controlling the extent of the risk bear the costs of invoking it.  If the practitioners inducing 
unnecessary consultations or ordering over-costly procedures, tests and pharmaceuticals are 
made to bear some of the additional costs of their excessive cost-causing activities, then the 
quantity of unnecessary consultations or over-costly tests and pharmaceuticals provided will 
reduce, thereby lowering the burgeoning costs levied ultimately upon policy-holders and 
taxpayers.  Consequently, insurers and governments now routinely enter into supply-side 
cost-sharing agreements with practices in an endeavour to constrain demand and costs (Ellis 
and McGuire, 1986; Robinson, 2004; Ma and McGuire, 2002; Ma and Riordan, 2002; Cutler 
and Zeckhauser, 2000; Danzon, 1997; Newhouse, 1996 amongst others).  Likewise, if patients 
are required to bear part of the costs of each consultation (via an excess or co-payment), then 
their propensity to engage in over-consumption may be muted, but not eliminated (Pauly, 
1968; Pauly, 2000).   
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2.4.2 Predictable Risk Under Supply-Side Cost-Sharing 
Capitation and price-and-volume contracts both directly address the predictable risk of too 
many consultations being provided under fee-for-service by imposing a cap on the quantity of 
services provided, either explicitly (price-and-volume) or implicitly (capitation).  If 
practitioners choose to provide more or higher-quality services than anticipated in the 
contract, practice profits are reduced and long-term financial viability is threatened.  
However, practices keep any savings from cost-reducing innovations as profits.  Thus, 
incentives for the pursuit of cost-reducing innovation are greater under supply-side risk-
sharing than fee-for-service contracts.  Capitation contracts have been used successfully in 
New Zealand to cap physician-controlled primary sector pharmaceutical and laboratory test 
spending (Malcolm, 1997).   
 
Whilst addressing the fee-for-service over-provision risk, supply-side risk-sharing contracts 
invoke further predictable risks.  Practices become more profitable under supply-side risk-
sharing by reducing costs in a manner contrary to purchasers’ intentions (e.g. providing 
lower-than-optimal service quality, such as shorter consultations, thereby reducing the 
benefits accrued by patients).  These additional risks are typically managed by additional 
incentives for quality or more extensive monitoring to ensure that quality is not compromised.  
Although these additional requirements may increase explicit purchaser costs, they are 
justified if the cost of the risks avoided exceeds the additional costs of monitoring and quality 
incentives.  In large part, the rise in managed care reflects increased endeavours by third-party 
payers to constrain the ‘predictable’ costs that the insurance risk management market creates 
(over-consumption from treatment subsidies).     
 
2.4.3 Random Risk Under Capitation 
The treatment of random risk under capitation is fundamentally different under capitation 
than under price-and-volume and fee-for-service. Capitation contracts pay a fixed fee f in 
respect of all individuals n for which the practice is responsible, irrespective of their actual 
demand for consultations. Under full capitation, the practice revenue is fixed at F = fn.  Under 
partial capitation, a lower fixed fee is paid, and a variable fee v is paid ex post for each 
consultation.  For q consultations delivered, practice revenue R is given by R = F + vq.  
When the cost per consultation is c, profit P is P = F - q(c – v).  Average Revenue per 
consultation is: 
AR = R/q = (F + vq)/q        (1) 
and Average Profit per consultation: 
AP =P/q = F/q + (v - c)       (2). 
7/26/2007 -14- 14
Under fee-for-service and price-and-volume, the practitioner receives no fixed component (f 
= 0) determined ex-ante, but is remunerated ex post with an average revenue per consultation 
of v.  Average profit per consultation is: 
AP = (v - c)        (3).  
The distinction between fee-for-service and price-and volume is that the number of 
consultations remunerated under equation (3) is restricted to an agreed number q = Q.  
 
Equations (1) and (2) illustrate clearly that, whilst practitioner choices may affect the number 
of consultations provided under capitation, so too will random unknown and unpredictable 
influences upon the number of consultations demanded (random demand risk).  By contrast, 
equation (3) illustrates that neither random nor predictable risk alter average revenues and 
average profits per consultation under fee-for-service and price-and-volume, as these are 
invariant to changes in q.    
 
Financial viability of capitated practices is thus subject to factors uncontrollable by the 
practitioners. Two practices with patients of identical ex-ante characteristics funded 
identically by capitation and taking identical steps to manage predictable risk face different 
risks to financial viability simply because one was ‘lucky’ (i.e. its patients were ‘healthier 
than average’ as a consequence of unknown and unknowable factors not included in the 
‘predictable’ factors determining contract compensation, or patients of this practice were not 
exposed to random demand shocks) and the other ‘unlucky’ (i.e. unpredictably ‘sicker than 
average’ patients, or exposed to random demand shocks).  To the extent that fixed capitation 
payments f are adjusted for differences in ex-ante assessment of likely future demand 
differences between individuals, such payments are capturing only that extent of individual 
demand that is able to be converted to predictable risk via the algorithms employed by the 
insurer.  The remainder is still unpredictable.  If, as identified above, it is likely that over 70% 
of demand variation is unpredictable, all capitated practices will inevitably be subject to 
substantial random demand risk arising from the distribution of patients amongst practices, as 
well as any other random shocks to demand that may occur (e.g. an outbreak of a new virus, 
food poisoning, etc.).   
 
When third-party payers enter into capitation contracts with service providers, they share both  
the ‘predictable’ contract risks arising from the presence of insurance and subsidised 
treatment, and some of the random demand risk which motivates patients to confer 
responsibility for managing this risk onto aggregated third-party risk-bearing entities in the 
first place.  In effect, capitation contracts result in primary care providers becoming 
underwriters (insurers) of random demand risk.  This confers on capitated providers all of the 
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responsibilities for managing reserves to meet variation in demand both in a single time 
period, and between time periods.  Hagen (1999) indicates that regulating provider-insurers to 
ensure reserves or alternative risk management activities (e.g. purchase of reinsurance) is a 
very complex task, even in markets such as California with long experience of capitation 
contracts and sophisticated insurance regulation processes in place.   
 
Under typical insurance arrangements, taxation or premium payments made by ‘lucky’ 
individuals can be used to pay the treatment costs of ‘unlucky’ ones.  The larger the patient 
pool, the greater the probability that the number of ‘lucky’ individuals closely matches the 
number of ‘unlucky’ ones.  The large pool has a greater likelihood of breaking even, or if 
profits or losses are made, they will be comparatively small.  If the same large pool is 
fragmented into many smaller pools, then the probability of a close match between the 
number of ‘lucky’ and ‘unlucky’ individuals in each pool becomes much less.  Some pools 
will be extremely lucky, making large profits, and others catastrophically loss-making.  
Unlike in the large pool, profits from ‘lucky’ small pools cannot be used to compensate the 
losses from ‘unlucky’ small pools.   ‘Unlucky’ pool owners must use their own resources to 
meet the losses. ‘Lucky’ pool owners become beneficiaries as they are able to extract the 
profits granted to them by the random effects, and ‘unlucky’ pool owners must contribute 
additional resources equal in total to the profits extracted by the ‘lucky providers’ in order to 
stay financially viable.  Thus, the cost of random risk management is substantially greater 
with a fragmented pool than with a single pool.  American research suggests that capitated 
primary health care pools of fewer than 25,000 registered individuals face significant risks of 
financial failure (Hagen, 1999; Robinson, 2004).    
 
If the gains and losses were truly random, then on average across time, gains incurred by a 
provider in some periods would cancel losses in others.  However, the ‘random’ effects 
shared with practitioners also include the errors in cost predictions and any other unknown 
cost-causing events that have not been factored into the contract remuneration.  They are 
‘unknown’ only to the extent that the algorithms predicting likely demand for an individual ex 
ante are imperfect proxies for the individual’s actual demand because they cannot accurately 
capture all relevant contributing influences.  These unknown factors (e.g. unknown genetic 
predispositions) are likely to be highly correlated with the individuals in the patient pools 
served by each practitioner.  As primary care patient pools are typically fairly stable between 
periods, loss-making and profit-making tend to become highly correlated between periods for 
a given practice, even though the initial allocation of patients to practices was genuinely 
random.  ‘Lucky’ practices thus tend to become habitually profitable, and ‘unlucky’ ones 
persistently loss-making.  As primary care practices are also typically very small patient 
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pools, the variations in profitability are likely to be very large.  These characteristics suggest 
that the additional risk management costs of capitation contracts are likely to be substantially 
greater in primary care than in other health care markets, such as surgery, where demand in 
each period is less likely to be correlated as the same individuals do not typically return for 
repeat care, and where the risk pool is larger (e.g. regional hospitals).   
 
Under capitation contracts, random risk and predictable risk are shared in exactly the same 
proportions.  If it is deemed desirable to share a defined proportion of risk to alter provider 
behaviour, then the same amount of random risk is shared as well, as the two types of risk are 
inextricably bundled.  The higher the proportion of a practice’s remuneration that is fixed 
(that is, the higher f is and the lower v is), the higher the amount of both types of risk that is 
shared.  Under full capitation (v = 0) all risks become the responsibility of the service 
provider, who is now the only risk-pooling entity – that is, the sole insurer.  The third-party 
payer bears none of the financial risks of either random or predictable patient demand 
variation.  Budget financing of a government entity is exactly equivalent to a full capitation 
contract, to the extent that the entity has no further recourse to government funds to ‘bail it 
out’ in the event of financial failure (the ‘soft-budget constraint’).   
 
Full capitation contracts thus almost completely ‘undo’ the economic benefits of patients 
pooling random risks via large insurance companies and governments, as they fragment the 
original risk pool, leaving patients sharing their random demand risks and purchaser 
estimation errors with a very much smaller number of individuals, in pools where demand 
characteristics are likely to be correlated over time.  The sole purpose for third-party payers 
under full capitation is to manage the contracting process and redistribution of resources from 
patients to practitioners with (presumably) lower transaction costs than the patients could 
achieve themselves, as the service providers become the insurers.   
 
2.4.4 Optimal Capitation Strength 
Capitation incentive strength is thus crucial for sector efficiency.  Yet, determining the 
optimal capitation contract incentive strength (that is, setting f and v) is fraught with 
difficulty.  The higher the degree of predictable risk shared (the higher is f, the lower is v), 
reducing the losses arising from over-provision, the higher the degree of random risk that is 
shared, raising the costs of random risk management.  If too little risk is shared by the third-
party purchaser (low f, high v), the desired changes in practitioner behaviour will not occur; if 
too much is shared (high f, low v), practice financial viability becomes a lottery,  as it is 
largely invariant to the amount of effort practitioners put into pursuing the desired behaviour.  
Perverse outcomes will inevitably emerge (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).   As the 
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allocation of random risk, the propensity for each provider to engage in over-production and 
the propensity for each consumer to succumb to over-consumption are unique to each 
purchaser-practitioner pairing, each contract optimally will be unique in its setting of f and v.    
In practice, however, this is impossible to achieve, given the high costs of procuring 
information that is itself likely to be quite imperfect (Gaynor, Haas-Wilson and Vogt, 2000).   
Thus, it would appear that perverse consequences are inevitable under capitation, as the risks 
and costs are most unlikely to be well-balanced.    
 
United States evidence suggests that substantial changes in practitioner behaviour have been 
achieved with very low-strength (low f, high v) incentives (Ma and Riordan, 2002).  Given 
that United States risk pools tend to be large, this finding suggests that the losses from 
predictable risks, whilst real, are substantially smaller in magnitude than the benefits of 
aggregated random risk management.  This would appear to be consistent with the United 
States finding that a substantial amount of variation in demand is unpredictable (Robinson, 
2004; Newhouse, 1996).  
 
In principle, therefore, primary care capitation contracts would appear to be most effective 
when the incentive strength is comparatively low.  The most costly error would appear to be 
offering too strong an incentive, making practice profitability over-dependent upon luck.  If 
the degree of predictable risk that it is desired to be controlled is high, then the amount of risk 
that can be shared without risking large luck-based variations in practice profitability will be 
greater the larger is the provider risk pool.  Conversely, if the provider risk pool is small, even 
very small amounts of risk-sharing may tip the balance such that random risk costs rapidly 
overwhelm the benefits of desired changes in provider behaviour.   Optimal capitation 
contracts will thus be highly dependent on individual practice characteristics.  A ‘one size 
suits all’ approach to setting the contract incentive will inevitably mean no practice will 
exhibit the precise proportions of behavioural change sought.  The challenge is ensuring that 
the incentive strength is set so that the costs of perverse outcomes do not overwhelm the size 
of the benefits sought from the behavioural change. 
 
2.4.5 Comparing Health Capitation with Other Capitation Contracts 
The perverse consequence of capitation contracts let by insurers ‘undoing’ more efficient 
random risk management arrangements occurs because the risk is contained within the 
‘closed circle’ of the patient, risk manager and care provider.  Both the risk manager and the 
service provider are agents of the patient.  The patient confers the random risk management 
agency to the insurer, and the treatment agency to the service provider.  However, risk-
sharing between the insurer and the provider affects the patient directly via the treatment 
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agency.  This is different from ‘linear’ contractual arrangements, where risk is shared between 
upstream and downstream parties with distinct and separate customers, suppliers and 
shareholders.  In this arrangement there is some room for tolerance in setting the capitation 
incentive strength.  If, for example, the incentive contract between a shareholder and a 
manager is not optimal, its negative consequences can be shared by the manager with many 
other stakeholders, and it does not directly affect the shareholder explicitly.  In the ‘closed 
circle’, however, there is no scope for dissipation – rather, the effects of errors are magnified 
as they are shafted back directly onto the party sharing random risk with the insurer in the 
first place.    
 
The perversity in health care markets is exacerbated by the fact that they very reason the 
insurer exists is to manage risk within the closed circle.  Insurer sharing of random risk 
necessarily reduces efficiency, even as sharing predictable risk increases it.  This is different 
from standard linear risk-sharing (e.g. employee remuneration split between fixed and piece-
rate components) as there is no other explicit risk management agreement governing the 
interaction.  Whilst the employee contract shares predictable risk and those elements of 
random risk that the employer might otherwise optimally bear (e.g. business cycle variations), 
these risks are secondary to the purpose of the firm’s and the contract’s existence.  The 
efficiency reduction from sharing random risk in the health case is thus of much greater 
consequence for industry outcomes than the random risk sharing in the employee 
remuneration case.   This suggests that optimal incentive strengths in health care will be lower 
than in many other industries, in order to avoid rapid ‘unravelling’ of the benefits of 
insurance, further supporting the conclusion above that capitation contracts in health care 
markets should be sparing in the amount of risk shared with practitioners, in order to avoid 
patients bearing the costs of perverse outcomes. 
 
3. Perverse Outcomes Under Risk Imbalances 
How, then, might the effects of over-strong capitation incentives play out in primary care 
markets?   In practice, capitation rates are often set globally for a large number of practices 
using information from historic service delivery averages.  The values of f and v are 
determined assuming an ‘average’ practitioner engaging in the desired behaviours will break 
even financially by providing an average number of consultations Q at the prevailing average 
cost c.  Such processes take account only of predictable risk. The aim is for all practices to 
deliver exactly Q consultations, and all will break even (i.e. no profits or losses).  Fear of 
financial failure results in more costly providers seeking out ways to reduce their costs to the 
average level, and over-supplying practitioners reducing quantities provided. However, as 
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Figure 1 illustrates, the presence of random risk means that, even if practitioners take all 
possible steps to lower costs and eliminate unnecessary consultations, practice profits will 
vary.  The number of consultations demanded q is now determined by random factors.  
‘Lucky’ practices with low demand (q < Q) make windfall profits, and ‘unlucky’ practices (q 
> Q) incur losses.  The stronger the contract incentive (the higher is f, the lower is v, meaning 
the slope of the average revenue curve is steeper), the greater the extent of the profits or 
losses arising from luck.  
Figure 1. Average Revenue Per Consultation 
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Practitioners faced with these outcomes will inevitably alter their behaviour in response to the 
profits and losses incurred.  Bearing in mind that the objective of capitation contracts was to 
limit consultation numbers, any full-quality consultation in excess of Q provided by an 
‘unlucky’ practitioner simply increases the size of losses incurred. ‘Unlucky’ practitioners can 
stem their financial losses only by limiting the number of consultations provided to Q (e.g. 
instituting waiting lists for consultations, ‘closing the books’ to new patients) or lowering 
costs of the q consultations delivered by reducing quality below the level anticipated in the 
contract (e.g. shorter consultation times).   As the reason that the practice is ‘unlucky’ is 
because by dint of luck its patients are demanding more consultations than average, the 
patients receiving lower-quality care must, ipso facto, be ‘sicker than average’.   The sharper 
the incentive (the steeper the average revenue curve in Figure 1), the greater the costs to the 
sickest patient pools, as the potential losses incurred by their practitioners is greater.   
 
Conclusion 1: ‘Sicker than average’ patients in capitated systems will on average receive 
lower-quality service than patients who are ‘healthier than average’, simply because of the 
7/26/2007 -20- 20
allocation of random risk amongst small pools.  The smaller the patient pools, and the sharper 
the contract incentive, the larger the variations in quality will be. On average the level of 
quality provided will decrease as the (unpredicted and unpredictable) average health state of 
the patients registered at a practice decreases.   
 
Conversely, ‘lucky’ practices, with ‘healthier than average’ patients requiring fewer 
consultations than average (q < Q) face no incentive to increase the number of consultations 
offered above the q luck has delivered them.  Each additional consultation provided above q 
will reduce their profits from luck (as v < c).  Whereas under fee-for-service or price-and-
volume remuneration these providers may be prepared to provide consultations to the 
unsatisfied patients of the ‘unlucky’ providers as capacity allowed, under capitation each 
additional consultation provided above q reduces windfall profits.  There are no rewards for 
working hard under capitation.  In fact, working harder (providing more consultations) simply 
reduces profits and increases the risk of financial failure.  Thus, even ‘lucky’ capitated 
practices may ‘close the books’ to new patients, despite having potentially idle capacity 
(spare time) relative to the fee-for-service quantity.   
 
Conclusion 2:  The allocation of random risk to providers under standard capitation contracts 
reduces the supply of consultations below the average number anticipated when the random 
risk is borne by the purchaser.  The sharper the incentives under the capitation contract, and 
the smaller the initial risk pools, the faster the effects of the reduction in supply will become 
evident, and the more rigidly the reductions in supply will be enforced by practitioners, in 
order to prevent financial losses or the erosion of profits gifted by ‘luck’.  
 
As capitation contracts turn service providers into insurers, the service providers now become 
open to the possibility of ‘cream-skimming’.  If service providers know about factors 
affecting the likelihood of an individual’s likely demand for care that are not accounted for in 
the capitation agreement (e.g. despite exhibiting the population-based characteristics on 
which funding is allocated, an individual is actually healthier than average for this group and 
a provider has access to this information but the purchaser does not), then the provider may 
use this information to increase practice profits (or reduce losses) by selectively choosing to 
accept or reject the responsibility for insuring an individual on the basis of whether the 
individual’s likely demand is higher or lower than the current practice average.  The provider 
need not know about an individual’s actual health state – the information about the practice 
where the patient was last registered, its service quality and its financial fortunes, may be 
sufficient to allow cream-skimming to occur.   
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For example, a patient wishing to transfer from a practice where quality is observably lower 
(due to financial distress) than the one to which the transfer is requested likely represents an 
increase in risk to the new practice.  Quality is lower at the first practice as average health 
state is lower, meaning there is a high probability that the actual health state of the individual 
seeking to transfer is lower than the current average at the second practice.  Higher demand 
from this individual will reduce the second practice’s profits, so it may be too risky to assume 
the individual’s risk either at all, or without further information (e.g. treating the patient on a 
‘casual’ basis in order to establish actual health state – a practice replicating the ‘stand-down’ 
period that usually accompanies a transfer between health insurers).   
 
Consequently, in capitated health systems, ‘cream-skimming’ leads to the sickest individuals 
being those most likely to be unable to find a health care provider, because health care and 
insurance are ‘bundled’ into the same contract.  Even though the ability for a practitioner to 
cream-skim may be limited by imperfect prediction algorithms, a risk-averse ‘lucky’ 
practitioner can afford to take the precautionary approach of avoiding new risks without 
risking existing profits by simply not registering new patients.  This is aided by the degree of 
stability in the existing patient pool – the more stable the patient pool, the greater the ability 
for ‘lucky’ practitioners to maintain profitability by ‘closing the books’. Thus, cream-
skimming need not be a deliberate activity based upon specific knowledge about a patient – 
rather, not registering is the dominant strategy for any ‘lucky’ practice with a stable patient 
list.  The effect of both types of cream-skimming is the same – a separation of patients 
between practices, based upon health care demand, simply because of the random allocation 
process.   
 
Conclusion 3:  Cream-skimming of patients will necessarily be associated with capitation 
contracts, simply because of the systemic effects of creating habitually lucky practices via 
random allocation. Deliberate cream-skimming using private information occurs in addition 
to this systemic effect.  Again, the sharper the capitation contract incentive, and the smaller 
the initial risk pools, the more aggressive the cream-skimming undertaken will be, and the 
greater the distortion in the allocation of patients by health state amongst practices.    
 
The ‘flip side’ of the incentive for ‘luckier’ practitioners to benefit from ‘cream-skimming’ is 
the propensity for ‘unlucky’ practices to grow larger in order to reduce the effects of random 
risk.  Whereas a ‘lucky’ practice faces the risk that a new patient is most probably ‘sicker than 
the current practice average’, the probability is greater than 0.5 that any new patient 
requesting registration at a ‘sicker than average’ practice is actually healthier than the current 
practice average (as the total population average, minus the ‘sicker than average’ practice, 
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will be healthier than the population average including the ‘unlucky’ practice).  There is a 
better than even chance that the new patient will raise the average health state of the practice.  
By this reasoning, in a capitated system, only ‘unlucky’ practices will willingly register 
patients of unknown health state.  Consequently, ‘unlucky’ practices will grow larger, 
replicating many of the benefits of spreading risk via a large risk pool.  However, these 
practices will still be ‘unluckier’ than the average practice, as the ‘lucky’ practices have 
skimmed off more than the average number of healthier-than-average individuals.  Growing 
larger simply minimises the extent of the losses to which the ‘unlucky’ practices are exposed.   
 
On the one hand, the benefits of size suggest that the pressure of financial failure amongst 
‘unlucky’ practices might lead to the active pursuit of mergers4 with other practices in order 
to stem the financial losses.  On the other hand, no rational practice owner will want to merge 
with a practice that is clearly ‘unluckier’ than his (and by the mere fact of seeking to merge, a 
practice may be signalling that it is ‘unlucky’).  If a practice is making profits, merging with 
the ‘unluckier’ practice (even if ‘lucky’ in absolute terms in that it is making positive profits) 
means that profits must be shared, and the ‘luckier’ practitioner receives less average profit 
per consultation under merger than under separation.  Likewise, no loss-making practice 
owner will want to merge with a practice whose losses are even larger, as the first practice 
owner will end up worse-off, becoming responsible for larger average losses in the combined 
entity relative to remaining separate.   
 
In practice, the problem of increasing practice size to reduce risk costs is solved by 
bifurcation of ownership form.  A private owner of a loss-making practice must personally 
bear the costs of losses from bad luck out of his own reserves (either cash injections, or 
accepting a very much lower return on his human capital than that received by ‘lucky’ 
practitioners).  If these costs are intolerable to the owner, or better opportunities are present 
(e.g. being hired as a salaried employee, where there is no obligation for a practitioner to bear 
any financial risk personally, as returns for effort under salary are certain), then the 
practitioner-owner of an ‘unlucky’ practice is better off ‘walking away’ than retaining 
ownership.  But, as the practice is loss-making, no rational owner will be prepared to invest in 
it.   A missing market for loss-making practices emerges. 
 
The only ownership group likely to voluntarily take up responsibility for serving the loss-
making pools will be ‘non-owned’ nonprofit and charity providers, who can make up the 
                                                     
4 The use of ‘merger’ here means the merger of patient lists in a truly joint practice where the providers become equity-sharing 
partners – that is, the substitution of sole ownership with a firm (i.e. ‘corporate’ form).  This is distinct from the co-operative 
form of independent practice associations or ‘group practice’ where each practitioner retains his own list.   
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deficits from other means not available to private owners (e.g. donations, tax exemptions), or 
even government (via taxation).    Such providers will likely be less averse to the prospect of 
merging practices and spreading the losses amongst a very much larger pool.  Whilst such 
actions will reduce the total costs of risk management, the large, ‘unlucky’ pools will still on 
average be making losses on the contract relative to the risk-free state, as ‘lucky’ practices are 
still extracting profits from their healthier than average patient pools.  Moreover, if the 
additional sources of revenues available to the non-owned providers are insufficient to cover 
the losses incurred, quality offered in the non-owned practices will still be lower than that in 
the privately-owned, ‘lucky’ practices.  Ironically, many nonprofit and charity providers often 
end up re-hiring as salaried employees the very practitioners who have ‘walked away’ from 
the practice because of its financial failure.  
 
By contrast, an aggressive market will emerge for private ownership of the ‘lucky’ practices.  
The ‘luckier’ (more profitable) the practice is, the greater the ‘bonus’ to the first owner under 
capitation contracts.  This owner not only makes and extracts large profits from luck, but 
when selling the practice, will be able to charge a premium (‘goodwill’) in proportion to the 
degree of luck enjoyed.  Prospective owners will be prepared to pay more for a more 
profitable practice up to the point where the premium paid equals the long-term profits able to 
be earned from luck.  However, only the first owner enjoys this bonus.  The purchase price 
premium paid by the second and subsequent owners increases the costs of service provision.  
Second and subsequent owners need to recoup not just a fair return on time expended, but 
also a fair return on the additional capital supplied, which was not present under risk-free 
contracts.  Indeed, the need for larger amounts of physical capital to purchase such practices 
may be a factor in inducing private sector non-practitioner ownership of primary care 
practices in capitated systems, in addition to the promise of gains arising from skilled insurer-
investors arbitraging against practitioner-owners’ comparative informational disadvantages in 
managing risk pools.   
 
Conclusion 4: Capitation unequivocally raises the costs of care delivery, not just by the 
additional payments injected to cover losses by ‘unlucky’ practices (both private and charity 
sources) but also by the introduction of capital costs in the financial structure of lucky 
practices not present under fee-for-service.   The sharper the capitation incentives, and the 
smaller the initial risk pools, the greater the additional costs incurred relative to fee-for-
service. 
 
Conclusion 5: Allocation of random risk in capitation contracts to practices will likely lead to 
changes in the patterns of institutional size and ownership form in primary care markets.   A 
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bifurcation between small ‘lucky’, profitable practitioner-owned practices and large, 
‘unlucky’ unprofitable practices served by nonprofit and charity providers with practitioners 
as salaried employees will emerge  The sharper the capitation incentive, and the smaller the 
initial risk pools, the faster this is likely to occur.    
 
Conclusion 5a: By combining Conclusions 1 and 5, the bifurcation of size and ownership on 
the basis of practice ‘luck’ will be further underpinned by quality differences.  If nonprofit 
and charity owners are unable to cover all losses from additional sources, the bifurcated 
market will be characterised by ‘unlucky’ large, nonprofit and charity providers, whose 
patients are on average less healthy, and who will likely receive lower quality care, and small, 
practitioner-owned providers whose patients are healthier than average and receive higher-
quality care than the patients of the non-owned practices.  Once again, the sharper the 
capitation incentive, and the smaller the initial risk pools, the faster the two-tier system will 
become established, and the greater the quality differences will be.   
 
Conclusions 1, 2 5 and 5a lead to a further conclusion that capitated systems will also be 
associated with a substantial degree of practitioner self-selection.  Capitation contracts 
provide no rewards for working hard (Robinson, 2001).  Practitioners who do not care to 
work as hard will prefer to become owners of the small, privately-owned practices where 
higher profits are earned for less effort.  However, if human capital is increased by experience 
gained from delivering more consultations and delivering those consultations to individuals 
who are ‘sicker than average’ (McGuire, 2000), then human capital will be accumulated faster 
by practitioners in ‘unlucky’ practices.   
 
On the one hand, higher levels of human capital may partially offset some of the costs of 
lower quality borne by patients of ‘unlucky’ practices, as per conclusion 1.  On the other 
hand, it suggests a second self-selection (adverse selection) problem. The practitioners with 
the greatest motivation to work hard to build human capital tend to be young and 
comparatively inexperienced.  They also tend to lack the capital to buy the now highly-valued 
‘lucky’ practices where profits can be made for exerting less effort.  These practitioners will 
likely select, in disproportionately large numbers, to work (as salaried employees) in 
‘unlucky’ practices.  Thus, in absolute terms, the difference in actual human capital employed 
may not be very great, especially if the younger practitioners tend to work hard initially to 
accumulate experience and the resources to subsequently fund the purchase of a private 
practice, which allows them to work at a more leisurely pace in the latter part of their careers.  
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Thus, ‘unlucky’ practices will tend to be serviced by younger less-experienced but more hard-
working practitioners than the ‘lucky’ practices5.   
 
The adverse selection problem, however, becomes more acute when hard-working 
practitioners of all ages and any amounts of human capital can select between capitated 
systems and fee-for-service ones.  Fee-for-service systems provide no penalties for working 
harder than average – rather, such behaviour is rewarded.  Thus, hard-working practitioners 
will accrue greater returns (both in accumulating human capital and generating a greater 
return investments in both human and physical capital) by working in fee-for-service systems 
than in capitated ones.  This suggests that where choice of contract type exists, adverse 
selection will affect the type of practitioners opting to practice in each system.   
 
Conclusion 6: Where choices of contract type exist, hard-working practitioners and those 
seeking to increase human capital more rapidly will self-select into contracts that minimise 
the amount of risk shared with practices (fee-for-service) rather than into risk-sharing ones 
(capitation, price-and-volume).  The long-run effect of such self-selection will be that when 
there is competition between different contract types, the average practitioner remunerated by 
the capitated contract will be less experienced and less hard-working than the average 
practitioner remunerated by a fee-for-service contract.  Specifically, young practitioners 
seeking to accumulate human capital quickly will select away from markets remunerated by 
capitation contracts.  Whilst some looking for an ‘easier life’ may buy into capitation 
practices later, thereby raising average human capital, those who genuinely wish to be well-
remunerated for working hard will eschew the capitated system.  Once again, the sharper the 
capitation incentive, the faster the effects of self-selection will emerge, and the more costly 
they will be.    
 
Ultimately, the effects of an improperly-balanced capitation contract play out in detriments to 
patients, in the form of either higher direct costs of primary health care (e.g. higher premiums, 
taxes or patient co-payments) or indirect costs associated with service quality than if the 
contract had been better-balanced.     The balance is fine, and as this section illustrates, the 
consequences of getting the balance wrong may be very large.  
 
                                                     
5 This finding is consistent with, but derived from a different origin to, the altruism literature that suggests practitioners who are 
more altruistic will self-select into the sectors where lower-quality care is delivered, in order  to ‘even up’ the distribution of 
available care – see, for example, Delfgaauw, 2007;  Glazer, 2002; Ma , 2004.  
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4. Policy Implications 
The preceding sections lead to the conclusion that the use of financial risk-shifting in health 
care contracts carries with it additional effects not normally considered in the agency theory 
of contractual risk-sharing, as a consequence of the fact that the purchasing party sharing the 
risk is already itself undertaking a risk management role.  Clearly, capitation contracts have 
long-term effects upon industry ownership and structure that are not costless, and must be 
considered when evaluating the efficacy of using a capitation instrument.  Moreover, these 
effects will be different in health care markets to those expected in other sectors, simply 
because the types of risks being shared are different, and more acute in primary care markets 
due to the historic patterns of small, practitioner-owned businesses and repeat transactions 
between the same patients and practitioners leading to correlations in risks across time.   
 
These factors tend towards the conclusion that capitation contracts are less desirable in 
primary care markets than other health care markets, and when applied the optimal incentive 
strength must be quite small in order to avoid the costly consequences of reallocation of 
random risks crowding out the benefits of predictable risks.  The six conclusions above 
suggest that the costs of getting the incentive strength wrong are substantial not just in respect 
of the costs of care, but also in the allocation of care and in respect of the choices made by 
practitioners when investing their human capital.  Unless the incentives are carefully 
balanced, substantial changes in sector organisation are likely to emerge, and these changes 
may not necessarily be in accordance with the objectives underpinning their implementation.    
 
In particular, by their handing of random risk, primary care capitation contracts lead to 
allocation systems that are less equitable in the allocation of the available resources on the 
basis of health need than either fee-for-service or price-and-volume contracts.  It is thus 
flawed logic where capitation contracts have been implemented as a means of engendering 
greater equity in the allocation of primary care resources (although it is noted that this may 
not be as strong an argument in respect of other types of health care, where correlated demand 
is less of a concern).   They are more equitable only if individual patient demand for primary 
health care is perfectly predictable and the propensity for both patient- and practitioner-
induced over-consumption is costlessly ascertainable, enabling a perfect incentive to be 
determined for each practice.  Moreover, the incentive strength must be adjusted each time a 
patient or practitioner either leaves or joins the practice.   
 
Clearly, none of the conditions for optimal capitation prevail.  Rather, as it is very costly, if 
not impossible, to ascertain the necessary information to set perfect incentives, and most 
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systems adopt a ‘one incentive strength for all’ approach (given differences for patients of 
different classes ex ante), the incentive will inevitably be ‘wrong’.  If the incentive is too soft, 
the desired changes will not be achieved.  If it is too strong, the result will likely be a 
substantially inequitable bifurcated system that is ‘fair’ to neither patients nor practitioners, 
and which costs substantially more per consultation than a fee-for-service system delivering 
the same number of consultations. This suggests that a capitated system will be of benefit 
only where there is evidence of substantial existing distortions from over-consumption, and 
then only if the incentive strength used is low.  Given that the optimal strength for primary 
care capitation contracts is low, and the costs and likelihood of getting the strength wrong are 
substantial, unless there is evidence of such distortions, then it may be easier and more cost-
effective to forego the use of capitation contracts in primary care, and concentrate instead on 
the use of non-financial instruments to achieve the desired behavioural changes.   
 
In the paper from which the opening quote in this discussion is taken, James Robinson muses 
why, given the extensive use of risk-sharing agreements in other sectors, use of the piece rate 
(i.e. payment per consultation) has persisted in health care.   He concludes that there is no 
ideal compensation contract for physicians.  He advocates a mixture of payment methods that 
minimise the costs of the side-effects of each type of contract.  As a general principle in 
health care contracting, this approach appears reasonable.  However, this paper would place a 
caveat on Robinson’s recommendation in suggesting capitation may be so fraught with 
difficulty in primary care settings that it should be employed as a last, rather than a first, 
resort when changes in practitioner behaviour are sought, and certainly not as an instrument to 
allocate system resources more ‘fairly’ based on health need or practitioner reward for effort 
in respect of providing consultations on the basis of health need.   It would also go so far as to 
suggest that, in respect of the allocation of random risk in primary care, the piece-rate has 
persisted as it is the least distorting payment method, and provides the greatest incentives to 
practitioners to work hard to improve the health outcomes for their patients.  Policy-makers 
and insurers would do well to bear this in mind when contemplating using their market power 
to unilaterally impose capitation contracts in primary care markets.    
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